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This paper deals with changes in managerial practices in Catalonia in an age of 
nascent capitalism (1830-1925) and adaptive family strategies in order to face the 
absence of state welfare. During the 19
th Century and in the absence of recorded labor 
contracts, human resources of the firm were organized by means of implicit contracts 
and informal labor markets. With the advent of scientific organization of labor, wage 
per hour worked began to be recorded.  This is why in the 1920s the perfect 
competition model applies to our case. On the other hand, in the same period, and in 
the absence of state welfare, ideas stemming from cooperative game theory apply to 
the pattern of household income formation. Kin related networks were used to 
improve the living standards of the household. In this particular direction we also 
show that there was a demonstration effect by means of which migrant’s living 
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This paper deals with changes in managerial practices in Catalonia in an age of 
nascent capitalism (1830-1925) and adaptive family strategies to face the absence of 
state welfare. During the 19
th Century and in the absence of recorded labour contracts, 
human resources of the firm were organized by means of implicit contracts and 
informal internal labour markets. With the advent of scientific organization of labour, 
wage per hour worked began to be recorded. This is why in the 1920s the perfect 
competition model applies to our case. On the other hand, in the same period, and in 
the absence of state welfare, ideas stemming from cooperative game theory apply to 
the pattern of household income formation. Kin related or no kin related networks 
were used to improve the living standards of the household. In this particular direction 
we also show that there was a demonstration effect by means of which migrants’ 
strategies of co residence were imitated with delay by natives and therefore migrant’s 





Recent research on both European and American societies has emphasised the 
significance of the relationship between the micro historical dynamics of working 
class household economies and major features of the labour market.
2  The key issue is 
the extent to which individuals were in a position to decide for themselves when and 
in what way to participate in the labour market.  The ratio between economically 
active and inactive members of the household, its size and structure and the type of 
economic activity all served to influence both workers’ earnings and which members 
of the family entered the labour market.  The impact of household dynamics on the 
composition of the workforce is even more apparent when focusing on those sections 
of the population, particularly women and children, whose employment is often not 
recorded in the census.
3 Estimates of living standards fail to take account of the 
unregistered employment of women and children and can therefore be misleading
4 but 
can be challenged by thorough analysis of family budgets.
5 
   3 
The aim of this essay is to d ocument transformations of the labour market at regional 
level using micro historical datasets. This micro historical analysis has allowed us to 
build time series as well as cross section evidence on the transformation of the labour 
market during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first third of the 
twentieth century.  The region under study is Catalonia, the only Spanish country that 
witnessed the formation of nascent industrial capitalism prior to 1830. During the 
eighteenth century economic specialisation took place within the region. According to 
Pierre Vilar’s
6 classic point of view, urban growth and agrarian specialisation in 
commercialised agriculture in the littoral led to increased consumption of woollen 
textiles of popular demand. These textiles were produced on a putting out basis and 
their employment expanded in the central part of the region and the Pyrenees. During 
the first decades of the 19
th century the loss of colonial markets, British industrial 
competition and the nature of  the domestic market itself involved the mechanisation 
of the textiles industry and the transition to the factory system.
7 And industrial 
investment was rooted in savings of emerging bourgeoisie of the region. But the 
absence of mineral resources and therefore the lack competitiveness in foreign 
markets prevented that industrial activities expanded in a greater extent.  In this 
context the demand for labour with capital intensive technologies could just increase 
up to certain limits. 
 
In the first part of the paper we will examine the practices adopted by management in 
order to determine wage levels in the Catalan labour market during industrialisation. 
 In this part we wish to ascertain whether the perfect competition model could apply 
to the labour market i n a context in which we shall see no written contracts were 
witnessing the agreements between employers and employees.  In the second part we 
shall see the transformations of the labour market during the early part of the second 
industrial revolution through a cross section analysis. Admittedly it is very difficult to 
quantify the nature of the regional labour market given the limitations of the sources 
that are available, but with care it is possible to examine for representative groups of 
textile workers  the factors that governed the supply of labour by households and its 
application within the factories. Aggregation methodologies would be less 
enlightening to this end, although more representative in statistical terms. On the other 
hand the factory-based datasets we have built up for the 19
th century allow for a time 
series evidence, which, for the moment, it is impossible to do with aggregation data. 
 
My last intention is to make a final reflection on how variations in the wages and the 
number of different members of the household reflected the absence in Spain in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of a system of state welfare similar to 
that which was already in operation in Britain.  For the latter it has been argued that 
its specific household formation patterns (small households restricted largely to 
couples and parents and unmarried children) were only made possible because of the 
financial assistance which the state provided to working families.
8 My argument, it 
should be stressed, is n ot that such assistance was unnecessary. However, I do wish to 
insist on the extent to which households were able to adapt their make-up in order to 
preserve their standard of living even when faced with an adverse economic situation. 
 
The contextual evidence on industrial Catalonia in terms of wage structures and 
family economies and welfare is limited.  Camps (1995) dealt for the first time with 
these topics by means of micro historical analysis of several middle sized industrial 
towns during the 19
th century.  Topics on charity welfare and women’s work in 18
th   4 
Century Barcelona were presented by the leading research by Carbonell (1997)
9. The 
new evidence from this article just tries to highlight new outcomes of research and 
implications for history and economic history. Nonetheless it  should be pointed out 
that urban population was growing fast in the period under study and by 1900 people 
living in towns and cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants accounted for 40 per cent of 
total population. According to De Vries (1881) only England and Wales and Scotland 
had higher rates of urbanization. In the period under study in most of these towns, 
including Sabadell, migration accounted for in between 40 and 60 per cent of total 
population. In Barcelona by 1900 60 per cent of the population was born outside de 
province and therefore a higher rate outside the town. Therefore overall Catalan towns 
and cities were receiving and intense influx of migration that is similar to that 




2 The formation of the factory labour market in the nineteenth century 
 
The relatively higher wages available in the industrial urban areas of Catalonia was a 
major attraction for immigrants with woollen textile cottage workers constituting most 
of the first cohort of urban factory workers (Camps 1992).  A second characteristic of 
the migration pattern, applicable to both industrial and agricultural areas of Spain in 
the nineteenth century, was that the majority of the migrants had already formed 
families which had reached a critical phase in their life cycle by the time they had 
settled permanently in an urban area.
11  In the Catalan industrial case, migration 
involved movement from town to town before a permanent job was acquired in the 
textile coal powered mills in urban areas.
12  The rapid adoption of capital intensive 
techniques in the period 1830-1860
13 produced a slow and sustained rise in the 
demand for labour.  Employers made substantial savings on their labour costs through 
increases in labour productivity.
14  Figure 1 charts the trends in the numbers employed 
in the textile industry between 1830 and 1913 and indicates that over this period there 
had only a modest increase in the demand for labour.
15  
 
Figure 1 records total employment in the textiles according to gender and including 
children. We think that the aforementioned series, when systematically registering 
work of women and children in addition to male adults, offers an alternative view to 
that which provides us with the results of the o fficial population censuses. Notice in 
this figure that the first pick in employment is 1850 when manual work was 
expanding and technological had been introduced in the spinning. Another result form 
the manual era is the high contribution by women. The pressure for demand of labour 
and its handicraft (domestic) organization made possible the high participation rates 
of married women. The decrease in textile employment in the 1850s and 1860s 
resulted from the transition from manual to mechanised work combined with the 
impact of the Civil War in North America (“cotton famine”), which was followed by a 
financial crisis.  In reality the supply of labour exceeded temporarily the demand as a 
result of the contraction of employment caused by technological change and the high 
propension of Catalan population to proletarianize (Camps, 1994). The presence of 
mobile textile workers with families is evidence of an uneven labour market in which 
there was a plentiful supply of labour.  Such a labour market obviously operated on 
the basis of cheap labour. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here    5 
 
Despite the high elasticity of the labour supply with respect to wages, we cannot 
apply the perfect competition
16 model to this period because of two main factors: the 
nature of labour contracts and the process of qualification. 
In the first place, starting with the nature of contracts, it should be highlighted that 
until the First World War, they were implicit, both in the literal sense of the word and 
in the sense attributed by the labour economy.
17 And there is a fundamental reason 
why that was so: written contracts did not exist. In our context, the word “contract” is 
used in its purest sense: that of a mutual agreement between the worker and the 
company. Thus, we have proof that employers and  workers reached a verbal 
agreement as to the retribution for the work done and what it consisted of and how it 
was organised. For example, the stages in the spinning process using the self-acting 
mule and weaving were organised in teams (that is to say, the team leader used 
subcontracted labour) and remunerated as piecework. Moreover, variable retribution 
was agreed to according to the team’s productivity and the company pay roll shows 
the net income of the group. This latter point suggests that logically t he man or 
woman that led the group and subcontracted labour gave their salary to their 
auxiliaries. Many jobs, due to their very nature, could not make use of factory 
economies of scale (corduroy finishing, piece workers, darner, launderers...) and were 
commissioned out to women living nearby to perform the at home. The working class 
aristocracy and foremen were, however, paid on a weekly or monthly basis. Blue 
collar workers and apprentices were paid per day worked. Such examples prove that 
in factories in the 19th century, different systems coexisted for the organisation of 
work and its remuneration. In short, as there were no written rules concerning the 
management of human resources, when workers were incorporated into a work post, 
their retribution and  how it was organised had to be agreed to. Therefore, in the first 
large companies and prior to the scientific methods of organising work which did not 
exist until the end of the nineteenth century, it was difficult to establish homogeneous 
formulas for production management, ending up, as we shall see, falling to a great 
extent, on skilled workers. Bookkeeping difficulties in a labour regime based on 
verbal agreements and a variety of ways of organising and remunerating labour lead 
one to believe that the job market was hardly one of perfect competition and was the 
root cause of the predominance of implicit contracts. 
 
Implicit contracts also become apparent when we analyse the time series evolution of 
wages according to the age cohort presented in table 1
18.  For example, the critical 
determinant of future earnings was the time elapsed since commencement of 
employment by each cohort of workers as Table 1 makes clear. Table 1 has been 
complied by linking marriage registers with the employment records of one of the 
largest textile cotton factories in the Iberian peninsula., ‘España Industrial S.A. in 
Barcelona (Sans).
19  It is significant that members of later cohorts never obtained the 
earnings of the first cohort after 1869-1871 which saw a conclusion to the firm’s 
growth before major restructuring occurred between 1887 and 1890.  The wage 
differentials experienced by the first cohort after 1870 suggests again that it is 
appropriate to consider implicit contracts as in force at this time.
20  Certain members 
of the first cohort were regarded with higher wages, which were not offered to better-
trained later cohorts.  This pattern of earnings departs from that which would be 
expected had perfect competition applied.  It also differs from nature of the 
relationship between wages and length of service in late twentieth century workers for 
which it has been observed that younger cohorts had an steeper slope of their   6 
longitudinal income evolution than the most senior. Longitudinal evidence of Table1 
shows instead that the highest rate of increase of income was obtained by the most 
senior cohorts in our 19
th century context.  In this respect ‘España Industrial, S.A.’ 
seems typical of much of Catalan industry in the nineteenth century, as portrayed in 
the trade union press.   In 1892, in the aftermath of a strike, the trade unions claimed 
‘in the event additional labour is required, follow custom and preference the most 
senior or, should fewer hands be needed, fire the most recent (workers)’.
21  Other 
practices resulted in the  adaptation to the factory system of the artisanal conventions 
of promotion and training which in turn yielded a system of labour allocation that 
resembled in some ways modern internal labour markets.
22 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In a labour market composed of cheap and abundant labour, implicit contracts and 
informal labour markets seem to have minimised the managerial transaction costs.  
Figure 2 and table 1 detail wages according to seniority and years of service, based on 
the analysis of payments made to individual employees while employed by España 
Industrial, S.A. 
 
We focus first on the length of the contracts of skilled senior workers.  The vital role 
played by senior artisans in every day management of labour and production 
guaranteed that their contracts were long: 7 years in average. Their promotional 
prospects, degree of skill and the organisational bases of the factory guaranteed that 
they became crucial for the smooth running of the firm.  Senior artisans undertook 
provided training and organised  their work teams in the factory.
23  This explains why 
their wages increased in line with their length of service. The wage of unskilled 
workers also increases along with years of service since these workers were in fact 
apprentices.  By contrast, foremen, d espite their position at the top of the wage 
hierarchy, did not see their wages rise with the passage of time. Most of these foremen 
had migrated to Barcelona from Alsace and were older than most other employees at 
the time they joined the firm.  For a managerial role, they needed language skills in 
order to discipline and motivate the workers.  Their primary function was to make 
feasible the transmission of new technology.  In addition, they were probably 
recruited to ensure an orderly process of labour recruitment.  The failure of their 
wages to rise with the length of their service can only properly be understood when 
we bear in mind that the most experienced artisans performed most of the managerial 
tasks.  It was only after the 1890s that training institutions within Catalonia were in a 
position to supply the middle-ranking and upper technicians to supervise production 
and the management of labour.  From this point we shall see labour markets were 
modernised, the relationship between seniority and the wage paid was modified and 
the managerial revolution transformed the internal job market.  This was the 
experience of ‘España Industrial, S.A.’ during the 1890s.  Only later did these patterns 
spread to other Catalan factories. After 1919, with the diffusion of scientific labour 
organisation, wages and labour procedures were standardised and the labour practices 
pointed out till now became obsolete.  
 
Insert Figure 2 at about here 
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3 The transformation of labour markets and household economies 1918-1936 
 
One of the legacies for the economic historian of Primo de Ribera’s Dictatorship 
during the 1920s is the information he demanded on the social and economic 
characteristics of the population.  Municipal archives across Spain contain, for the 
year 1925, the M unicipal Censuses of Population that include both economic and 
demographic data.
24  For the town of Sabadell, detailed information on the economic 
activity and income of every member of the household has been preserved. The 
municipal Census of 1925 can also fill some of the gaps in the 1920 returns. The 
nominal record linkage of the Labour Census of 1919 with the Municipal Census of 
1920 revealed that approximately 30 percent of the employed population were 
missing from the 1920 Municipal Census.  Nevertheless, this absent population was 
recorded in 1925 and their residence patterns uncover some of the strategies families 
adopted to maintain their standard of living. For Sabadell, all three sources, the 
Labour Census of 1919, the Municipal Census of 1920 and Municipal Census of 1925 
have been linked.  This town provides an interesting case study of migrant waged 
workers as is evident from its rapid expansion (from 2,000 inhabitants in 1787 to 
20,000 in 1887 and 45,000 in 1925). Most of the inhabitants were migrants 
themselves or had parents or grandparents who had migrated to Sabadell. They had 
nothing to inherit, whether they were first generation migrants or descendants of 
earlier migrants.  There is evidence to show that most migrant urban households 
found i t difficult to accumulate savings and lived at subsistence level.
25  In other 
words, the family and household strategies that operated in the urban context were not 
influenced by other exogenous factors such as inheritance law and practice. 
 
Evidence of the new patterns of labour allocation within the wage earning population 
is presented in Figures 3 and 4 for the employed population. Figures 3 and 4 are 
constructed by means of the calculation of the average age according to occupation 
and the corresponding  average wage. Workers reporting a casual work and who 
declare no earnings are also included. In figures 3 and 4 we can notice that men and 
women undertook casual work at various ages and of different regional origin.  
Altogether such casual workers comprised in the 1920s some 20 percent of the 
economically active population when the Spanish economy was prospering and full 
employment could be anticipated. Nonetheless we must remember that Sabadell was 
specialised in the woollen textiles, and textiles in general did not take profit of the 
neutrality of Spain during World War I. 
 
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here   
 
Figures 3 and 4 also make clear the relationship between age and income was very 
similar for natives,
26 and migrants. This involves a sharp contrast with the situation in 
the nineteenth century when migrants and those born in prosperous industrial towns 
had different expectations of future income over their working lives as a result of the 
implicit contracts as discussed above.  In the nineteenth century, members of the first 
cohort, the equivalents of the natives in Figures 3 and 4, had entered the factory 
labour market at a younger age than more recent immigrants and received higher 
wages (see Table 1 above).  Admittedly, Figures 3 and 4, unlike Table 1, relies on 
cross-sectional not longitudinal data.  The evidence though is sufficient to indicate the 
absence of any association in 1925 between length of service and the prospect of   8 
future earnings. Had there been such a relationship, immigrants who settled in the 
town later in life would have been less well paid over their life cycle than were 
natives. And this apply for men as well as for women. This proves that implicit 
contracts developed in an imperfectly competitive labour market during the nineteenth 
century were surmounted during the interwar period.  On the one hand, capital 
accumulation, the development of a modern banking system, the use of electrical 
power and the creation of training institutions all helped to modernise the labour 
markets. O n the other hand, the diffusion of the second industrial revolution and after 
1919 the spread of scientific labour organisation which meant the written accountancy 
of hours worked and of the wage per hour, transformed the nature of labour contracts. 
In this new context in which labour contracts were recorded and the management of 
human resources on a modern bases was made plausible the labour market 
segmentations pointed in part 2 were logically removed.
27 This pattern of identical 
income of migrants and natives is different to the one observed for overseas 
migration
28 form Northern Europe in which there was a gap of 15 years for migrants 
to reach the same income as natives. Nonetheless in this last case it is also observed 
that when the nature of training was identical wages were also identical. In our case 
migrations were mainly intraregional and therefore the process of training was similar 
for natives and migrants.  With equal training when obstacles to free competition were 
removed the wages according the place of birth became the same. Another result form 
these figures in terms of life cycle is that after the age of 50 the income was declining 
for men. Therefore we can expect that this age is indicative of the  beginnings of the 
third age. The third age threshold for women is also 50 years old. But women’s 
participation rates after the age of 40 abruptly declined in opposition to those of men. 
Camps(1998). 
 
By 1925 there had been an improvement in the economic condition of working 
married women relative to t hat of working men.  Whilst it is true that during the 
eighteenth century most married working class women undertook paid work, they 
could earn as little as one twentieth of the wage of a senior artisan.
29  In the nineteenth 
century the earnings of women remained stable as they aged and job contracts were 
short,
30 evidence of another kind of labour market segmentation: one based on gender.  
By 1925 women could for the first time expect their wages to rise during at least part 
of their working life.  One reason for this was that they could take advantage of long 
term job contracts and on-the-job training that were so typical of the large firms that 
emerged during the early twentieth century phase of the industrial revolution.   
 
On the other hand, although research on other regions has documented the entry of 
married women into the labour market even before the Second World War,
31 our 
results show only 20 percent of married women earning wages from factory work.  
Such a low rate of participation in the labour market demonstrates the short run 
effects of mandatory schooling and hence investment in human capital on the supply 
of labour.  Mandatory schooling coupled with the fall in fertility during the 
demographic transition had the immediate effect of modifying the supply of family 
labour.  The entry of married women into the paid labour market cannot be explained 
solely in terms of a reduction in the amount of time women devoted to housework and 
a more egalitarian approach to the employment of women.  Another factor 
occasioning the entry of married women into the labour market was that one of the 
major supports of family economies in the nineteenth century, work by children
32 lost 
some of its earlier importance.  Not only did the birth rate fall abruptly but also larger   9 
numbers of children delayed their entry into the labour market, increasing the demand 
for additional income. In figure 3 we can also observe that the active life of women 
came to an end at the age of 40. If we bear in mind all works women had to perform a 
plausible conclusion is that by that age they were already old. 
 
Nevertheless, higher rates of participation in the labour force by married women as 
compared with the situation in the nineteenth century
33 and rising wages over part of 
their life courses, failed to meet all the consumption needs of their households.  
Additional sources of income were required, and these included contributions by 
women through migration and sub-letting accommodation to lodgers.  To these issues 
we now turn. 
 
By 1925 many u rban households had become complex according to the data presented 
by Camps (1998) and reproduced in Figure 5.  The nature of the complexity differed 
from that produced by impartible inheritance which governed the transmission of land 
in the region and typically involved the co-residence of a married son with his parents.  
By contrast, household complexity in Sabadell involved the presence in the household 
of collateral kin.  The financial contribution to the household of unmarried relatives 
such as siblings and cousins replaced the income that children might otherwise have 
provided, depleted as a result of mandatory schooling and the demographic transition.  
What we want to emphasise here is that not only the perfect competition model 
applies to the labour  market but also co-operative game theory applies to the 
formation of the household income. By co-operative game theory we imply the 
existence of a bargaining process among the members of the household that leads to 
the maximisation of the utilities of the  individual and the group (household) as well. 
In the absence of welfare, in a situation of relatively cheap labour and the 
transformations of the activity ratios of the household caused by the fertility decline 
and mandatory schooling, other relatives provided to the household as much as the 25 
per cent of the household income during the first stages of the formation cycle. 
Normally this collateral kin were also migrants and while providing incomes to the 
household they were making use of the already settled households facilities. As we 
have said, in a situation of scarcity of economic resources this process led to the 
improvement of the economic position of both collateral kin and of the other members 
of the household. 
 
   In a town in which population was  mainly composed of migrants, in the absence of 
welfare they still need to attract other economically active persons into their 
households and find alternative sources of income.  Children entered the workforce at 
a later age than in previous generations and there were fewer of them as fertility fell.  
In the nineteenth century, the situation was very different as we have already 
demonstrated in that the earnings of children were an important element of many 
family economies.
34  By contrast families in Sabadell in the early twentieth century 
could take advantage of the abundant supply of labour and the elasticity in respect to 
wages.  The absence of state welfare in combination with the cheap supply of labour 
made feasible the development of adaptive family strategies that activated kin 
networks. 
 
 We can also see how the average income of the household head sharply decreases 
after the age of 40. By then children had completed compulsory schooling and 
became the bases of the family economy. Despite the important contribution of   10 
collateral kin in the first stages of the household formation cycle, the latter diminution 
of the wage of adult males had as a result de incorporation of children in the labour 
force normally at the age of 15. Therefore children were not  only the main human 
asset to face the third age but their contribution to the household income helps to 
explain the adaptive family strategies just presented. 
 
 These results differ from those which reflect British experience.
35  The evidence from 
Britain i s that the sources of household income were naturally limited to members of 
the simple family household: couple and offspring.  In these circumstances working 
families needed state welfare in order to maintain their standard of living. In the 
absence of state welfare, family economies in Catalonia appear to resemble other 
examples from continental Europe.  The aforementioned distinctive forms of family 
agreements to improve the living standards seem to apply in other contexts.
36  
However, British family forms have recently been revisited, revealing higher degrees 









Our purpose above has been to establish how employer and family strategies 
responded to an elastic labour supply with respect to wage, in the absence of a welfare 
system that involved a significant transfer of resources from rich to poor.  During the 
nineteenth century and in the absence of written labour contracts large firms 
minimised their labour transaction costs through the adoption of i mplicit contracts and 
informal internal labour markets.  After 1919 with the spread of scientific organisation 
of labour, the agreements between employer and employee were standardised and 
recorded in detail.  With the availability of written contracts labour markets 
modernised and wage and labour prospects became homogeneous for all workers in 
the same gender group.  The perfect competition model temporarily applied and 
segmentation of the labour market according to gender diminished. 
 
Within the household, the absence of state welfare was overcome by means of 
distinctive forms of workers’ solidarity.  Despite the modernisation of the labour 
market, the different components of family income reveal the extent to which 
economic survival was still difficult.  The high frequency of complex households 
together with the presence of lodgers, demonstrates how migrant workers had to 
supplement their income by expanding their households to enable other economically 
active persons to contribute to the family economy.  We have stressed the major 
contribution of the work undertaken by migrant married women in bringing into the 
household collateral relatives.  Nevertheless in due course natives began to imitate the 
residential strategies of migrants.  This indicates that the entire working class needed 
to attract additional sources of income to supplement what could be provided by 
members of a simple family household.  In Sabadell by 1925 migrants were clearly 
more prosperous than natives because although their earnings were equally stable 
across the life course, they were better able to expand their households by 
incorporating additional wage earners.  In historical terms our example proves that 
populations in the past reacted in front of adversity making available the economic   11 
resources needed to guarantee subsistence. In the absence of welfare, families 
attracted other economically active members into the household (kin related or not) in 
order to provide additional sources of income. In economic terms our case study 
provides an example that proves that the ideas stemming from game theory can be 
applied to the formation of household income in populations of the 20
th century.  
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                                                               TABLE 1 
                                  WAGES ACCORDING TO THE MARRIAGE COHORT 
                                                           Period of marriage.  
                            1837-46                              1847-56                               1857-67 
                       N.Obs.    Wage                N.Obs        Wage                     N.Obs.     Wage 
1847-51             126      13,21                 148             9,62                          47          6,86 
1852-56             213      15,67                 475           11,66                        238          8,11 
1857-61               45      18,09                 119           13,33                          83          9,40 
1862-66               25      19,84                   69           13,72                          53        12,64 
1867-71               20       20,11                  50           14,50                          41         14,55 
1872-76               19       19,91                  44            15,62                         48         15,62 
1877-81               17       20,69                  44            16,36                         36          16,46 
1882-86               12       22,81                  30            16,04                         34          17,66 
 
                        Source: Camps (1995). Table made up of the nominal record linkage of the 
                                    Payrolls of the firm “España Industrial, S.A.·” and the marriage 
                                    registers of the Bishopric of Barcelona.          
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